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HIGHLIGHTS 
 Stroke patients are inclined to consciously control their movements 
 This inclination slows down gait in dual- but not single-task conditions 
















Background: Many stroke patients are inclined to consciously control their movements. This 
is thought to negatively affect patients’ motor performance, as it disrupts movement 
automaticity. However, it has also been argued that conscious control may sometimes 
benefit motor performance, depending on the task or patients´ motor or cognitive capacity. 
Aim: To assess whether stroke patients’ inclination for conscious control is associated with 
motor performance, and explore whether the putative association differs as a function of task 
(single- vs dual) or patients´ motor and cognitive capacity. 
Methods: Univariate and multivariate linear regression analysis were used to assess 
associations between patients’ disposition to conscious control (i.e., Conscious Motor 
Processing subscale of Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale; MSRS-CMP) and single-
task (Timed-up-and-go test; TuG) and motor dual-task costs (TuG while tone counting; 
motor DTC%). We determined whether these associations were influenced by patients’ 
walking speed (i.e., 10-meter-walk test) and cognitive capacity (i.e., working memory, 
attention, executive function).  
Results: Seventy-eight clinical stroke patients (<6 months post-stroke) participated. Patients’ 
conscious control inclination was not associated with single-task TuG performance. 
However, patients with a strong inclination for conscious control showed higher motor 
DTC%. These associations were irrespective of patients’ motor and cognitive abilities.  
Conclusion: Patients’ disposition for conscious control was not associated with single task 
motor performance, but was associated with higher motor dual task costs, regardless of 












Clinical Relevance: Therapists should be aware that patients’ conscious control inclination 
can influence their dual-task performance while moving. Longitudinal studies are required to 
test whether reducing patients’ disposition for conscious control would improve dual-tasking 
post-stroke. 
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INTRODUCTION 
     A motor task like walking is often assumed to be a relatively automated task that requires 
minimal cognitive involvement.[1, 2] However, walking may invoke enhanced degrees of 
conscious control in special circumstances, such as under fatigue or stress, or in special 
groups, such as elderly with fear of falling or rehabilitating patients.[3-7] For example, 
following a stroke individuals typically become strongly inclined to consciously guide their 
movements, and consider this necessary for ensuring successful locomotion and preventing 
falls.[4] Physiotherapists tend to encourage such conscious control, by providing patients 
with explicit movement-related knowledge and rules to execute their movements[8], cf.[9]. 
However, it remains uncertain to what degree conscious control is actually functional, and 
whether this would depend on patients’ inclination for conscious control. 
     Theoretically, conscious control is regarded a dysfunctional strategy – at least in healthy 
adults. Maxwell and Masters [6] argued that individuals with strong disposition for 
conscious control “de-chunk” motor skills to control each chunk separately. This would 
result in less automated, more jerky movements, and consequently, suboptimal performance. 
Indeed, such “trait” conscious motor control has been found to have negative effects on 












conscious control are more likely to experience performance degradation or even a total 
performance break-down when they feel anxious about their performance, or when they have 
to perform multiple tasks simultaneously.[2, 3, 5, 6, 10] Similarly, instructions that promote 
state conscious control also result in suboptimal motor performance and learning.[11, 12] 
     Based on these observations in healthy adults, it has been proposed that stroke patients’ 
generally strong conscious control inclinations may impede their motor recovery.[4, 13, 14] 
Yet, evidence is scarce: only Orrell and Masters [4] related patients’ conscious control 
inclination to their motor recovery. Results showed that patients with a relatively strong 
inclination for conscious control (i.e., as measured by higher scores on the Conscious Motor 
Processing subscale of the Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale (MSRS-CMP)) 
experienced larger impairments in activities of daily life.[4] However, studies that directly 
manipulated patients’ state conscious control through instructions provide ambiguous 
evidence. Two studies found that instructions that trigger conscious motor control (i.e., 
internal focus) had a negative impact on patients’ motor performance,[15, 16] while three 
studies did not find any effect.[17-19] Also, one study reported trends toward better dual-
task performance when stroke patients were given instructions that aimed to trigger 
conscious control, rather than “external” focus instructions that aimed to minimize conscious 
control (by directing attention to the task goal).[18]   
     For clinical practice, the question thus remains: what are therapists to do? Should they 
attempt to reinforce or reduce patients’ conscious motor control inclination?[18] We suspect 
that a proper answer requires taking into account 1) the strength of patients’ inclination for 
conscious control, 2) the task constraints, and 3) patients’ cognitive and motor capacities. 
With regard to the first, there are indications that promoting conscious control (for instance 
with internal focus instructions) may be more beneficial to motor performance for people 












performers with a weak inclination.[18, 20, 21] Regarding task constraints, conscious control 
of movement is thought to place significant demands on cognitive resources such as working 
memory and attention.[6, 22, 23] Hence, a strong conscious control inclination may be 
especially detrimental to performance in cognitively demanding conditions, such as when 
performing two tasks concurrently. Similarly, with regard to patients’ cognitive capacities, a 
strong conscious control inclination may be detrimental to performance of cognitively 
impaired patients, but may be relatively beneficial for motor performance in patients with 
better cognitive capacity. Finally, motor capacity may also be an important factor; it has 
been proposed that some degree of movement automaticity has to be established before it 
can be disrupted by conscious control.[6] Accordingly, a strong conscious control inclination 
may disrupt motor performance of patients with mild or no motor impairments, but benefit 
performance of patients with severe motor impairments. Indeed, preliminary evidence in 
healthy adults[24, 25] and stroke patients[18] points in this direction.  
     Our primary study aim was to further explore the relation between stroke patients’ 
inclination for conscious control and motor performance. To this end, we assessed whether 
clinical stroke patients’ inclination for conscious control (i.e., as indicated by the MSRS-
CMP[18, 26]) is associated with performance on a clinical mobility test (Timed-up-and-Go; 
TuG[27, 28]). In addition, we intended to explore whether the purported relations differ as a 
function of task constraints and patients’ motor and cognitive capabilities. To this end, 
patients performed the TuG both in single- and dual-task conditions. We hypothesized, first, 
that a strong inclination for conscious control is associated with worse single- and dual-task 
motor performance. Second, we hypothesized this negative relationship to be more 














Participants and setting 
     We included patients with stroke who received inpatient rehabilitative care in Heliomare 
Rehabilitation Centre in Wijk aan Zee, the Netherlands between 27 January and 7 March 
2017. Participants were recruited for a larger RCT, either in the pilot phase (n=11) or in the 
proper experimental trial (n=67).[29] We refer to this paper for details on patients’ 
inclusion.[29] Inclusion criteria were: First-ever or recurrent stroke <6 months ago, FAC>2, 
able to stand independently >1 minute, able to understand instructions and cooperate with 
neuropsychological assessment, no other central nervous system or orthopedic impairments, 
and no uncorrected visual/hearing impairment. Figure 1 shows the study flow.  
     Power analysis with G*power showed inclusion of at least 65 patients to be necessary to 
find a moderately strong association (f=0.20) between the inclination for conscious control 
and motor performance (linear multiple regression, alpha-level of 0.05, beta of 0.80, and 
four independent variables).  
Ethics Statement 
     All participants provided written informed consent. The study protocol was approved by 
the medical-ethical committee of the VU Medical Center in Amsterdam (VUMC protocol 
ID: 2015.354).  
Data collection 
     The following tests and outcomes were used: 
     Conscious motor control inclination: Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale-Conscious, 
which consist of a Motor Processing Subscale (MSRS-CMP) and a Movement Self 
Consciousness subscale (MSRS-MSC). This questionnaire is meant to assess a person’s 
inclination to reinvest and has been validated for use in clinical stroke patients.[14] The 












reported here: the data for the MSRS-MSC can be found in Appendix 3. MSRS-CMP 
comprises five statements about conscious motor processing in movements in daily life (e.g., 
‘I reflect about my movement a lot’). [26] Statements are scored on a 6-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), with total scores ranging between 5-
30 points. Higher scores reflect stronger inclination for conscious control.[30] 
     Motor task: Patients performed the Timed-up-and-Go (TuG), a mobility test that is 
frequently used in clinical practice.[27, 28] For this test patients stand up from a chair, walk 
three meters, turn around and sit down again, all at comfortable speed.[27] Motor 
performance is defined as the time needed to complete the test (in seconds). Participants 
were allowed to use a walking aid if required.[27] The TuG is sensitive to interference from 
cognitive tasks, such as talking, and has good reliability and satisfactory construct 
validity.[28, 31, 32] 
     Cognitive dual-task: In dual-task conditions, participants had to concurrently perform the 
TuG with a tone counting-task.[33] For this test high and low tones were randomly presented 
every 1500 milliseconds. Participants were required to respond as accurately and quickly as 
possible by saying ‘yes’ when the tone was high-pitched and instructed to count the number 
of high-pitched tones.[33]  On completion of each trial, participants were asked to report the 
total number of high-pitched tones. They received feedback regarding counting 
accuracy.[33]  In single-task conditions, participants simply sat on the chair and performed 
the tone counting task for 30 seconds. The tone counting task is challenging enough to 
induce dual-task interference in stroke patients,[18] and is suitable for most patients with 
expressive aphasia.[18]  
     Walking speed: As measure of motor capacity, we assessed patients’ comfortable walking 
speed using the 10-meter walk test. For this test, patients walk a 10-meter straight path at 












seconds). This test has no ceiling effect and excellent reliability and construct validity.[35] 
     Cognitive capacity. Participants’ education level was recorded as measure for general 
cognitive ability.[36] Trained neuropsychologists administered specific tests of working 
memory (total number of correct sequences on Digit Symbol Substitution Test DSST),[37] 
executive function (interference score on Color Trails Test; CTT),[38] and sustained 
attention (concentration performance score on D2-test).[39] All tests have acceptable 
psychometric properties, [34, 36-38, 40] and are suitable for most aphasic patients.[18]  
     Finally, the Nottingham Sensory Assessment (NSA) was administered to describe 
patients’ gnostic and vital sensibility and proprioception.[41]  
Procedure 
     Measurements were performed on two occasions. On the first occasion, participants 
completed the neuropsychological assessment (i.e., DSST, CTT, and D2-test). The 
remaining tests (Appendix 1) were administered by the researcher or trained research 
assistants in a second session. First, patients’ were familiarized with the TuG and tone 
counting task, to make sure that they understood the tasks and were able to discriminate 
between the high and low tones. This session started with the 10-MWT, followed by the 
single-task tone counting assessment, the single-task TuG (TuG-ST), and the dual-task TuG 
(TuG-DT). For the TuG-DT trials, participants were not specifically instructed to prioritize 
either task. For reliable assessment and to minimize bias due to fatigue, each test was 
performed twice, with the order reversed during the second series.[34] The MSRS and the 
NSA were administered on completion of the second session. Other patient characteristics 













     For the tone counting task, high (1000 Hertz) and low pitch (400 Hertz) stimuli were 
presented for 300 milliseconds with customized LabVIEW software (National Instruments; 
Austin; Texas) via high quality speakers, which were positioned at two meters from the side 
of the walkway. Verbal responses were recorded with a directional microphone using 
LabVIEW, and sampled at 1000 Hz. 
Data analysis 
     The total MSRS-CMP score is the sum of the five statements of this subscale, and ranges 
between 5-30.  
     Single-task TuG was defined as the mean time needed to perform the two TuG-ST trials. 
Single-task tone counting performance (i.e., reaction accuracy (%), counting accuracy (%), 
and reaction time in ms) was analysed using customized Matlab software.[18] To correct for 
a possible speed-accuracy trade off, a composite score was calculated per trial (Equation 
1).[44] An average composite score was calculated for the single- and dual-task conditions 
separately. 
 Composite score =
(Average counting+reaction accuracy%)
median verbal reaction time (in ms)
     (1) 
     To assess dual-task performance, we calculated the dual-task costs (DTC%; Equations 2 
and 3).[18, 45] Positive DTC% reflects deterioration of performance in dual-task relative to 
single-task conditions.[45] DTC% was calculated for both the TuG (i.e., Motor DTC%) and 
tone counting task (i.e., Cognitive DTC%). 
Motor DTC% =
DT motor performance−ST motor performance)
ST motor performance
∗ 100%   (2) 
 
Cognitive DTC% =
−(DT cognitive performance−ST cognitive performance)
ST cognitive performance













     First, we assessed the association between the inclination for conscious control (MSRS-
CMP score) and single-task TuG performance with univariate linear regression. Second, we 
used similar regression analysis to assess the association between the MSRS-CMP score and 
motor DTC%. Cognitive DTCs% were added as covariate, to correct for possible task 
prioritization differences between participants. i  In addition, Holm-Bonferroni[46] t-tests  
assessed whether significant dual-task interference occurred (i.e., if DTC% significantly 
differed from zero). Alpha was set at 0.05. 
     Next, we explored for both models whether walking speed (10-MWT) and cognitive 
capacity (i.e., DSST, CTT, D2-test) influenced the associations between MSRS-CMP and 
TuG. This was done by evaluating the interaction of each variable with MSRS-CMP. Each 
variable was tested in separately. For these modification analyses, alpha was Bonferroni-
corrected to 0.0125 (0.05/4).  
     For all regression analyses, the assumptions of homoscedasticity (inspection of plot of 
standardized residuals and predicted values), error-independence (Durbin-Watson 
>corresponding boundaries), lack of multicollinearity (VIFs<1.6, tolerances>0.6), and 
normal distribution of errors were verified (i.e., Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test). ii  Two 
participants were excluded from the analyses in which we explored how 10-MWT 
performance influenced the relation between MSRS-CMP and TuG-ST. For both 
                                                             
i We primarily focused on the relation between patients’ inclination for conscious control and motor dual-task 
performance. This because conscious should more directly impact motor control (and hence motor dual-task 
costs). Any effects on cognitive dual-task costs could only arise indirectly, through increasing attentional costs 
of movement. To make sure that cognitive dual-task costs did not confound our results we did include them as 
a covariate. For comprehensiveness, we include a subsidiary analysis in which we assessed the relation 
between patients’ conscious motor control inclination and cognitive dual-task costs in Appendix 2. 
ii Kolmogorov-Smirnov was significant for two multivariate regression analyses with TuG-ST as dependent 
variable. These concerned the analyses in which we explored the interaction between MSRS-CMP and (1) 10-
meter walk test, and (2) CTT-scores (both: KS>0.120, p<0.05). [47] However, plots did not show substantial 
deviations from normality, and log-transformation of the dependent variable did not significantly improve the 
KS values. Therefore, our main analyses concerned the untransformed TuG-ST. For these two analyses, we do 












participants it was found that Cook’s distances>1, suggesting that they disproportionately 
influenced group results.  
RESULTS 
Patient inclusion and characteristics 
     Figure 1 shows the study flow. In total, 238 stroke patients were screened for 
participation, 78 of whom were eventually included in the study (Mage=59.1±10.8 years; 49 
men, Mdays since stroke=31.9±19.7). Table 1 details all patient characteristics, including the 
outcomes of the TuG assessments, 10-Meter Walk Test, and cognitive tests. 
 
Relation between stroke patients’ conscious control inclination and single-task TuG 
     Figure 2 shows patients’ TuG performance in single-task conditions. Univariate linear 
regression analysis showed no association between patients’ MSRS-CMP score and single-
task TuG performance (p=0.710; Table 2A). Patients’ total MSRS-CMP score did not 
interact with walking speed (10-MWT; p=0.944), working memory (DSST; p=1.00), 
sustained attention (D2; p=1.00), or executive function (CTT; p=0.240).  Thus, patients’ 
inclination for conscious control was not related to their single-task motor performance, 
regardless of their comfortable walking speed or cognitive capacities. 
Relation between stroke patients’ conscious control inclination and motor dual-task costs 
     Figure 2 shows the average TuG performance in dual-task conditions, while Figure 3 
shows the average composite scores on the tone counting task. Both motor TuG DTCs (i.e., 
8.28±10.80) and cognitive tone-counting DTCs (i.e., 4.49±19.20) significantly differed from 












patients walked significantly slower and performed significantly worse on the tone-counting 
task in dual-task compared to single-task conditions.  
     Univariate linear regression analysis showed a positive association between MSRS-CMP 
and motor DTCs (p=0.033; Table 2B). Patients’ MSRS-CMP score did not interact with 
walking speed (10 MWT; p=0.904), working memory (DSST; p=1.00), sustained attention 
(D2; p=1.00), and executive function (CTT; p=0.468). Combined, patients with a stronger 
inclination for conscious control (i.e. higher MSRS-CMP scores) showed worse dual-task 
performance, regardless of their comfortable walking speed or cognition.  
 
DISCUSSION 
     This study examined the relation between the inclination for conscious motor control and 
motor performance in clinical stroke patients. Also, we explored the possible modulatory 
role of task constraints (single- versus dual-task conditions) and patients’ motor and 
cognitive capacities.  
     As expected, stroke patients in this study scored high on the MSRS-CMP subscale 
(21.5±5.9) – that is, comparable to scores reported in earlier studies in stroke patients,[4, 14, 
18] but significantly higher than in healthy older adults[10, 48, 49]. Thus, patients in our 
sample were on average strongly inclined to consciously control their movements. 
     We hypothesized that stronger conscious control inclinations would be associated with 
worse motor performance, and more so in cognitively demanding dual-task conditions. This 
hypothesis was partly confirmed: Patients with stronger conscious control inclination 
showed similar single-task TuG performance compared to patients with weaker inclinations, 
but they did demonstrate significantly greater slowing down of TuG performance when 
required to perform a dual-task. Hence, if we assume that patients with a stronger conscious 












across motor tasks and conditions, then it appears that this is an appropriate strategy to 
perform movements in relatively easy, single-task conditions. However, when required to 
dedicate a large chunk of their cognitive capacity to dual-task performance, these patients do 
no longer have sufficient cognitive resources to consciously control movements, resulting in 
a break-down of motor performance. Our findings may partly explain the results of Orrell 
and Masters [4] who found that chronic stroke patients with higher MSRS-CMP scores 
experience greater impairments in daily life. Perhaps, these observations are due to a dual-
tasking deficit, considering that most activities of daily life require patients to divide 
attention between two or more tasks (e.g. walking when talking, attending to the traffic lights 
while crossing the street).  
An alternative (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) explanation for our findings may 
be that patients with stronger dispositions for conscious control become especially triggered 
to do so in dual-task conditions, but much less so in the single-task condition. Masters and 
Maxwell [6] predict that people with a stronger conscious control inclination are more easily 
triggered to do so when they are anxious about their performance, but not necessarily in low-
pressure environments (when compared with people with weaker inclinations, that is). For 
many stroke patients, having to perform dual-tasks may certainly be perceived as 
threatening. Patients may worry about their ability to successfully divide their attention, as 
well as about the possible consequences of failing to do so (i.e., falling). If so, it could 
certainly be that this especially triggered patients with stronger conscious control 
inclinations to rely on conscious control while dual-tasking -  which ironically seemed to 
impair their dual-task performance. It is difficult to say which of these explanations holds 
true, considering that we did not measure patients’ state anxiety or include an additional 












tasks. In fact, it may well be that both mechanisms are at work. Future research is needed to 
examine these propositions.  
     Patients’ comfortable walking speed and cognitive characteristics did not influence the 
association between their conscious control inclination and single-task TuG performance or 
dual-task costs. Hence, there is no evidence for our hypotheses that stronger conscious 
control inclinations would be especially detrimental to motor performance of patients with 
better walking ability or poor cognition. With regard to the cognitive tests, the absence of 
results may be an artefact of the chosen tasks. All three tasks (DSST, D2, and CTT) were 
deliberately selected because they could also be used for assessment of patients with 
expressive aphasia. By definition these tests thus do not (or minimally) require verbal 
processing. However, conscious motor control has been suggested to rely on such verbal-
analytical processing.[2, 6] Future studies may specifically investigate whether patients’ 
scores on tests of verbal cognitive processing determine whether conscious control will 
benefit or harm their motor performance. 
Clinical implications 
     We found that patients with a strong inclination for conscious control showed greater 
decrements in motor performance in dual-task conditions compared to patients with less 
pronounced conscious control inclinations. This observation is of importance for clinical 
practice, as increased dual-task interference may impede daily functioning and increase fall 
risk [50]. On the one hand, this seems to suggest that conscious control might negatively 
impact dual-tasking ability, and that therapists may therefore attempt to minimize their 
patients’ inclination for conscious control (i.e., in those patients who score high on the CMP 
subscale). On the other hand, reducing gait speed during dual-tasking may also be a strategy 
that patients adopt to ensure safety of walking. We must emphasize that we cannot determine 












research. In any event, our results do show that a stroke patient’s conscious control 
inclination may be an important factor for successful dual-tasking. 
 If therapists want to minimize patients’ inclination for conscious control, one potential 
method would be implicit motor learning.[51] With implicit learning, patients become only 
minimally aware of the specifics of what is learned. As a result, they will be less likely to 
acquire verbal rules and knowledge that they can use to control their movements (see 
Kleynen and Braun [52] for an overview and examples of specific implicit motor learning 
interventions). We encourage therapists in daily rehabilitation practice to experiment with 
implicit motor learning interventions for patients with strong conscious control inclinations. 
Still, when doing so, therapists need to be aware that applied implicit motor learning 
research in stroke rehabilitation is still in its infancy.[22] Also, recent studies suggest that 
some patients – such as those with more severe motor impairments – may benefit more from 
strategies that promote explicit, conscious control of movement rather than from implicit 
strategies (see [18]). Future research is needed to delineate (subgroups of) patients that could 
benefit from strategies that promote (explicit) conscious motor control and learning, and 
those that benefit more from implicit strategies. 
Strengths and Limitations 
     A primary limitation of this study was its cross-sectional design, which prohibits 
inferences about causality. Second, we performed multiple separate effect modification 
analyses per variable. This likely increased the possibility of chance findings. On the other 
hand, these analyses had been planned beforehand and alpha was corrected with Bonferroni. 
Another potential limitation of the current study is that we did not investigate the role of 
patients’ scores on the Movement Self-Consciousness (MS-C) subscale of the MSRS. Factor 
analyses show that CMP and MS-C subscales measure different concepts [14,26]. While the 












primarily relates to self-awareness. Recent studies also suggest that the MS-C score reflects 
the extent to which a person monitors (but not controls) movement execution [53,54]. In 
fact, Van Ginneken et al. [54] found that MS-C score (but not CMP score) positively 
correlated with a person’s mindfulness score. This suggests that the MS-C subscale measures 
the degree to which someone observes his/her movements, without attempting to consciously 
control them. Considering the uncertainty as to the specific construct measured by the MS-C, 
we decided to focus on the CMP subscale. We did include results of linear regression 
analyses with the MS-C scores in Appendix 3. Overall, MS-C scores were not associated 
with TuG-ST or motor dual-task costs. A final methodological limitation of our study was 
that the duration of the single-task trials on the tone counting task was always set at 30 
seconds, whereas many patients walked faster in the dual-task trials. Thus, duration of trials 
did not always match. We are confident that this did not affect the outcome of our dual-task 
analysis, though. We repeated the regression analysis of motor dual-task costs, but now 
added dual-task TuG performance as covariate as well to correct for a potential effect of trial 
duration (next to the independent variables CMP and cognitive dual-task cost). Results were 
unchanged: CMP was still significantly associated with dual-task costs, and both B and p-
values only showed minor changes (B=0.439, p=0.043, 95%CI Beta [0.013, 0.865]). 
     A strength of this study is the large sample size. Also, the stroke group was fairly 
heterogeneous in terms of motor, cognitive, and stroke characteristics, and therefore 
representative for the sub-acute stroke population with walking ability. Further, the motor 
task used (TuG) is a clinically relevant mobility task that is often used in clinical practice. 
Combined, this makes our results directly relevant to clinical practice.  
Conclusion 
     Motor performance was less robust to dual-task interference for stroke patients with 












regardless of their motor or cognitive abilities. Longitudinal studies are needed to investigate 
whether reducing patients’ strong conscious control inclination would improve their dual-
tasking ability. 
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Fig 2. Average single- and dual-task motor performance. Time to complete the Timed-up-and-Go Test in 
seconds ± Standard Error. Abbreviations: TuG, Timed-up-and-Go-test; s, seconds.  
 
Fig. 3. Average single- and dual-task tone-counting performance. Tone-counting performance expressed as 
a composite score (± Standard Error) whereby accuracy (%) was divided by reaction time in milliseconds. 
Higher composite score indicate better performance. NB: Average reaction time (ms) in single task was 571±12 
and in dual-task was 603±16. Average reaction accuracy (± Standard Error) in single-task was 93.1%±0.8 and 















NB: 10-MWT, 10-meter walk test; AFO: Ankle Foot Orthosis; BBS: Berg Balance Scale[42]; CCI: Charlson Comorbidity 
Index[43]; CTT: Color Trails Test; DSST: Digit Symbol Substitution Test; FAC: Functional Ambulation Categories[35]; 
LACS: Lacunar stroke; MSRS-CMP: Conscious Motor Processing subscale of Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale; N: 
number; NSA: Nottinham Sensory Assessment; PACS: Partial Anterior Circulation Stroke; POCS: Posterior Circulation 
Stroke; SD: Standard deviation; TACS: Total Anterior Circulation Stroke; USER: Utrecht Scale for Evaluation of 
Rehabilitation[47]; 
a Fifteen patients used an Ankle-Foot-orthoses, one patient used a toe-off and one patient used functional electrical 
stimulation of the n. peroneus  
b Several participants did not complete the DSST (n=6), D2-test (n=6) and/or Color Trails Test (n=9), due to no patient 
consent (n=2), no therapeutic consent (n=1), early discharge (n=1) or difficulties in comprehending one or more of these 
neuropsychological tests. 
  
Table 1. Patient characteristics   
General characteristics (N=78) Value  
 Age in years (mean±SD)  59.1±10.8 
 Gender (male/female) 49/29 
Stroke characteristics  
 Days since stroke (mean±SD) 31.9±19.7 
 Days since admission (mean±SD) 16.1±15.4 
 Stroke aetiology (haemorrhagic/ischemic) 18/60 
 Side of affected hemisphere (left/right/NA) 38/35/5 
 Stroke subtype (n)  
 TACS/PACS/LACS/POCS/PACS+POCS 4/38/20/15/1 
 Recurrent stroke, yes/no 6/72 
 Aphasia, yes/no 18/60 
 Neglect, yes/no 19/59 
 NSA (0-80; mean±SD) 72.4±9.6 
 CCI (mean±SD) 0.7±1.2 
Motor functioning  
Walking device (walker/cane/none) 21/16/41 
Walking orthosis (yesa/no) 17/61 
BBS (0-56; mean±SD) 47.3±9.6 
FAC (3/4/5) 22/31/25 
10-MWT (s, mean ±SD) 15.1±8.8 
TuG-ST (s; mean±SD) 17.9±11.2 
TuG-DT (s; mean±SD) 19.3±12.0 
Cognitive functioning  
Education level (1-7; median±25th; 75th percentile) 5 (4; 6) 
DSSTb (mean±SD) 45.5±18.1 
D2-testb (mean±SD) 118.2±45.4 
CTTb (mean±SD) 1.0±0.5 
Conscious control inclination  
MSRS-CMP (5-30; mean±SD) 21.5±5.9 
MSRS-CMP (5-30; mean±SD) 14.6±5.7 
General functioning  
USER-mobility (0-35; mean±SD) 24.4±7.1 
USER-self-care (0-35; mean±SD) 30.6±5.3 












Table 2A. Summary of results of linear regression analyses for single-task motor performance 
 
Association with MSRS-CMP B p 95% CI of B  R2 R2-change 
Inclination for conscious control 
(MSRS-CMP) 
0.081 .710 -0.352, 0.515 0.002  
Effect Modificationa B p 98.75% CI of Bb  R2-changeb 
Motor capacity (10-MWT)c,d 1.670 0.000* 0.886, 2.454 0.810 0.807* 
MSRS-CMP x 10-MWT -0.017 0.944 -0.054, 0.019   
Working memory (DSST) 0.115 1.00 -0.739, 0.969 0.031 0.030 
MSRS-CMP x DSST -0.010 1.00 -0.050, 0.029   
Sustained attention (D2) -0.026 1.00 -0.292, 0.240 0.008 0.008 
MSRS-CMP x D2 0.000 1.00 -0.012, 0.012   
Executive function (CTT)e 21.365 0.264 -8.043, 50.774 0.054 0.053 
MSRS-CMP x CTT -0.979 0.240 -2.291, 0.334   
Table 2B. Summary of results of linear regression analyses for motor dual-task costsf 
Association with MSRS-CMP B p 95% CI of B R2 R2-change 
Inclination for conscious control 
(MSRS-CMP) 
0.461 .033* 0.038, 0.883 0.067  
Cognitive dual-task costs  0.049 0.446 -0.078, 0.176   
Effect Modificationa B p 98.75% CI of Bb  R2-changeb 
Motor capacity (10-MWT) -0.716 0.540 -1.931, 0.498 0.103 0.035 
MSRS-CMP x 10-MWT 0.026 0.904 -0.029, 0.081   
Working memory (DSST) -0.089 1.00 -0.939, 0.760 0.062 0.004 
MSRS-CMP x DSST 0.002 1.00 -0.037, 0.042   
Sustained attention (D2) -0.084 1.00 -0.338, 0.169 0.080 0.011 
MSRS-CMP x D2 0.004 1.00 -0.008, 0.015   
Executive function (CTT) -12.765 0.968 -40.540, 15.010 0.138 0.071 












Abbreviations: B, unstandardized coefficients, MSRS-CMP, Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale; CMP, subscale 
Conscious Motor Processing; 10-MWT, 10-meter walk test; DSST, Digit Symbol Substitution Test; CTT, Color Trails Test.  
*p<0.05, italics: p<0.1 a For each variable, a separate model was run. b The effect modification analyses were corrected 
using Bonferroni, such that alpha was 0.0125, and the confidence intervals were 98.75%. c Two participants had to be 
excluded due to Cook’s >1.d Results did not substantially change when log-transformed TuG-ST scores were used: 10-
MWT x MSRS-CMP interaction, p=1.00; e Results were slightly less distinct when log-transformed TuG-ST scores were 
used: CTT x MSRS-CMP interaction, p=0.296. f For the analyses of motor and cognitive dual-task costs one person was 
removed – this because of consistently outlying scores on the tone counting task (mean Z-score = 2.6) and earlier doubts as 
to whether this person understood the task correctly. Sensitivity analyses showed that including this patient in the analyses 
would not substantially alter results. 
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